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Abstract  
We consider normalized average edge betweenness of a network as a metric    
of network vulnerability. We suggest that normalized average edge between-
ness together with is relative difference when certain number of nodes and/or 
edges are removed from the network is a measure of network vulnerability, 
called vulnerability index. Vulnerability index is calculated for four synthetic 
networks: Erdös-Rényi (ER) random networks, Barabási-Albert (BA) model of 
scale-free networks, Watts-Strogatz (WS) model of small-world networks, and 
geometric random networks. Real-world networks for which vulnerability 
index is calculated include: two human brain networks, three urban networks, 
one collaboration network, and two power grid networks. We find that WS 
model of small-world networks and biological networks (human brain 
networks) are the most robust networks among all networks studied in the 
paper.  
Key words: complex networks, vulnerability, graph theory, centrality measures, 
network topologies  
PACS: 89.75.-k, 02.10.Ox  
__________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Introduction  
  In everyday life we are surrounded with complex networks; examples include 
social networks (collaboration networks), technological networks (com- 
munication networks, the Internet, power grids), information networks (the 
World Wide Web, language networks), biological  networks  (protein–protein  
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interaction networks, neural networks, ecological networks) and etc. A cen-
tral issue in the analysis of complex networks is the assessment of their ro-
bustness and vulnerability. Dierent approaches to address network robust-
ness and vulnerability have recently been proposed by research community.
The rst approach is related to structural robustness [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]: how
dierent classes of network topologies are aected by the removal of a nite
number of links and/or nodes. It was concluded that the more heterogeneous
a network is in terms of, e.g., degree distribution, the more robust it is to
random failures, while, at the same time, it appears more vulnerable to delib-
erate attacks on highly connected nodes. In addition, the occurrence of blind
spots (i.e. isolated nodes) can be of great interest when studying structural
robustness in applications such as sensor networks. Using the percolation
framework, this phenomenon is investigated in [6]. The second approach
concerns dynamical robustness [7, 8, 9, 10]. For networks supporting the
ow of a physical quantity, the removal of a node or link will cause the ow
to redistribute with the risk that some other nodes or links may be overloaded
and failure prone. Hence, a triggering event can cause a whole sequence of
failures due to overload, and may even threaten the global stability of the
network. Such behavior is termed cascading failure.
In general, the vulnerability of complex networks can be either node or
edge vulnerability. One method of measuring node vulnerability is proposed
in [11]. Latora and Marchiori measure the vulnerability of a node V (i) as
relative drop in performance after removal of the i th node together with all
the edges connected to it. Then they argue that the maximal value V of V (i)
over all i corresponds to the network vulnerability. As an addition to this,
authors in [12] introduce an additional parameter called the relative variance
h. This parameter is a measure of the uctuation level and it is used to
describe the hierarchical properties of the network, and thus its vulnerability.
In this paper we consider the normalized average edge betweenness as a
metric for network vulnerability. Recently a multi-scale measure for vulnera-
bility of a graph is suggested by Boccaletti and his co-workers in [13]. In spe-
cial case, when the multi-scale coecient equals 1, it reduces to the average
edge betweenness. We discuss relations of this metric to some graph charac-
teristics. We also investigate how the normalized average edge betweenness
uctuates when certain nodes or edges are removed from the network. We
measure the vulnerability of four synthetic networks: random (Erd}os-Renyi)
network, geometric random network, scale-free network, and small world net-
work. Finally, we measure the vulnerability of dierent real world networks:
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the Erd}os collaboration network, logical network of the brain, physical net-
work of the brain, and EU and US power grid networks. The same analysis
is also carried out for three urban transport networks: Turin's, Milan's and
London's road network.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces a measure of
network vulnerability called vulnerability index. In Section 3 we discuss
vulnerability index for the synthetic networks. Section 4 summarizes the
results of vulnerability analysis of real networks. Section 5 concludes this
paper.
2. Network Vulnerability
In this paper we consider networks that can be modeled as simple graphs.
A graph is an ordered pair G = (V;E) comprising a set V of vertices or nodes
together with a set E of edges or lines, which are 2-element subsets of V . A
simple graph is an undirected graph that has no self-loops and no more than
one edge between any two dierent vertices. Average edge betweenness of
the graph G is dened as [13]:
b(G) =
1
jEj
X
l2E
bl (1)
where jEj is the number of the edges, and bl is the edge betweenness of the
edge l, dened as:
bl =
X
i6=j
nij(l)
nij
(2)
where nij(l) is the number of geodesics (shortest paths) from node i to node
j that contain the edge l, and nij is the total number of shortest paths. The
average edge betweenness of graph G is related to the characteristic path
length L(G) as [13]:
b(G) =
N(N   1)
2jEj L(G): (3)
where N is the number of nodes in the graph.
Recently a multi-scale measure for vulnerability of a graph is suggested
in [13]:
bp(G) =
"
1
jEj
X
l2E
bl
p
#1=jpj
(4)
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for each value of p > 0. In order to compare two networks G and G0, one
rst computes b1. If b1(G) < b1(G
0), then G is more robust that G0. On the
other hand, if b1(G) = b1(G
0), then one takes p > 1 and computes bp until
bp(G) 6= bp(G0). For typical (both synthetic and real) graphs b1(G) 6= b1(G0),
so in the following we adopt b1(G) = b(G) as a measure of vulnerability.
From (3), even though L(G) and b(G) can be interchangeably used to de-
scribe the vulnerability of the network as a whole, we have chosen average
edge betweenness because when computing b(G), we can gather information
on which edge carries the most of the network vulnerability. Additionally,
this measure can be also extended for weighted and directed graphs (not
considered in this paper).
We rst evaluate b(G) for some particular networks. A complete graph
is a simple graph in which every pair of distinct vertices is connected by
an edge. The complete graph on N vertices has N(N   1)=2 edges. For a
complete graph, we have b(Gcomplete) = 1. A path graph is a particularly
simple example of a tree, namely one which is not branched at all, that is,
contains only nodes of degree two and one. In particular, two of its vertices
have degree 1 and all others (if any) have degree 2. For a path graph with
N nodes, jEj = N   1, and therefore:
b(Gpath) =
N(N + 1)
6
(5)
It is easy to see that b(Gcomplete)  b(G)  b(Gpath). As a consequence,
we can dene normalized average edge betweenness of a network as:
bnor(G) =
b(G)  b(Gcomplete)
b(Gpath)  b(Gcomplete) =
b(G)  1
N(N+1)
6
  1 : (6)
Clearly 0  bnor(G)  1; if normalized average edge betweenness is close to
0 it means that the network is more robust, when is close to 1, then network
is more vulnerable.
We dene two quantities related to average edge betweenness, namely
relative dierence of the average edge betweenness when a nite number of
nodes are removed from the network as
Dnode(G) =
bnor(G
0)  bnor(G)
bnor(G)
; (7)
whereG0 = (V nfv1; v2; : : : ; vmg; EnEv) is graph obtained fromG by removing
nodes v1; v2; : : : ; vm 2 V and all edges incident to the nodes v1; v2; : : : ; vm (the
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set Ev). In a similar way, we dene relative dierence of the average edge
betweenness when a nite number of edges are removed from the network as
Dedge(G) =
bnor(G
0)  bnor(G)
bnor(G)
; (8)
where G0 = (G;E n fe1; e2; : : : ; eng) is graph obtained from G by removing
edges e1; e2; : : : ; en 2 E. When using the equations (7) and (8) we assume
that both networks G and G0 are connected. There are two questions to
be addressed when using the equations (7) and (8). The rst one is how to
choose nodes and edges to be removed? When removing a node (or an edge)
from a network, one can remove a random node (edge) or a node which
is the highest ranking node according to some ranking method, such as:
PageRank [14], node degree, and node betweenness, or edge betweenness,
when an edge is removed. The second question is how small or large the
number of removed nodes (edges) should be? If m;n are small (for example,
m = 1 and n = 1), then the relative dierences Dnode and Dedge could be
vary small numbers (statistically insignicant). On the other hand, for large
m and n the network can be disconnected.
We think that in order to measure the vulnerability of a network G one
metric is not sucient. Thus, the main contribution of work is that we pro-
pose the triple (bnor(G); Dnode(G); Dedge(G)) as a measure for the robustness
and/or vulnerability of a network G. Thus, for example, the network is ro-
bust when all three quantities bnor, Dnode, and Dedge are small. We call the
triple (bnor; Dnode; Dedge) vulnerability index of the network.
3. Vulnerability Index for synthetic networks
In this section we discuss vulnerability of several synthetic networks.
 Erd}os Renyi (ER) random networks { The random network of Erd}os
and Renyi is a prototypical model for complex networks. An ER net-
work with N nodes is constructed by linking each pair of nodes with
the probability b=[(N  1)=2], or by adding bN links between randomly
selected pairs of nodes, where the link density is given by b and the de-
gree distribution follows the Poisson distribution with the mean degree
< k >= 2b. For ER graphs the probability that a degree of a certain
node will have large deviation from the average value is exponentially
small. For the characteristic path length of the random ER graph,
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from [15], we have L(G)  lnN=ln < k >: Therefore, the average edge
betweenness for the ER graph can be estimated as (for large N):
b(GER)  N
< k >
ln(N)
ln(< k >)
:
 Geometric random networks (GR) { GR networks are characterized by
nodes that are randomly distributed in the space, and are connected
only to the nodes in their proximity [16]. This topology is suitable
for sensor networks and its structural robustness is studied in [17] by
nding the critical point for the occurrence of blind spots.
We adopt the following algorithm for the generation of a geometric
random network, with average node degree < k >. We generate the
network on 2D space, i.e. nodes are randomly scattered along a square
terrain of 1m2 and their connectivity radius is related to the average
node degree < k > and the number of nodes N :
r =
r
< k >
N
(9)
Then if the network is connected, the process nishes. If not, the giant
component is found and the nodes which do not belong to the giant
component are again randomly scattered. The process nishes when
the giant component includes all the nodes in the network.
 Small-world networks { We use the Watts-Strogatz (WS) model as de-
ned in [15] for generating the networks. The algorithm uses a starting
ring lattice to construct a small-world network. In a ring lattice each
node has 2K neighbors, K in the clockwise and K in the anti-clockwise
direction. Each edge is rewired with probability , not allowing self-
loops or multiple edges between nodes. For the numerical simulations
in this paper we use  = 0:1 and K = 6. For average edge betweenness
of WS networks we have
b(GWS)  b(GER)  N
< k >
ln(N)
ln(< k >)
(10)
 Scale-free networks { The original BA algorithm as given in [18] is
used to construct scale-free networks. One starts from a seed of M0
6
connected nodes and adds a new node with M  M0 links at each
step according to the preferential attachment rule. Each new node i is
connected to M of the existing nodes with a probability:
pi =
kiPN
j=1 kj
(11)
where ki is the degree of the node i and kj of node j (j = 1; : : : ; N).
The parameters M0 and M are chosen such that M0 = 4 and M = 3.
For the Barabasi-Albert (BA) scale-free graph the characteristic path
length [19] is estimated to L(G)  ln(N)=ln(ln(N)), thus,
b(GBA)  (N   1)
< k >
ln(N)
ln(ln(N))
(12)
The vulnerability and robustness of networks are considered for four dif-
ferent network classes: random ER network, geometric random (GR) net-
work, WS small-world network, and BA scale-free network. For all networks,
the number of nodes in the network is N = 500 and the average node degrees
< k > of the networks is close to 6. The average clustering coecient for the
ER network is 0:014, the GR network has an average clustering coecient
of 0:627, the coecient for the WS small world network is 0:447, and BA
scale-free network has 0:055. Before the removal of nodes and/or edges, all
considered networks are connected.
We rst consider the structural robustness of networks: how networks
are aected by the removal of a nite number of nodes and/or edges. More
precisely, we ask the question: how many networks are disconnected when
a nite number of nodes (or edges) are removed? We consider 100 network
samples for each network class, and remove 10 nodes with the highest PageR-
ank scores. The results are: for BA networks 70% are disconnected, for WS
networks 0% are disconnected, for GR networks 50% are disconnected, and
for ER networks 20% are disconnected. However, when 10 edges with the
highest edge betweenness are removed from the network, the results are: for
BA and WS networks the percent of disconnected networks is 0, for ER net-
works 80% are disconnected, and for GR networks 90 out of 100 networks
are disconnected.
Next we consider the dynamical robustness of networks. We rst cal-
culate bnor(G). Then Dnode(G) is calculated when ten the most important
nodes (with the highest PageRank scores) are removed from each network.
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Figure 1: Dynamical robustness of synthetic networks
bnor(G) Dnode(G) Dedge(G)
|||| |||| |||{
ER 0.0441 0.025 0.002
WS 0.0655 0.01 0.0058
BA 0.0388 0.16 0.0038
GR 0.175 0.004 0.0105
Table 1: Dynamical robustness of synthetic networks
Finally, we calculate Dedge(G) for dierent network classes, when ve the
most important edges (with the highest edge betweenness) are removed from
the network. The results are shown in Figure 1 and the values of the vulner-
ability index are given in Table 1.
One may conclude that for BA network, bnor(GBA) has the smallest value,
but Dnode(GBA)) has the largest value among all four network classes (for BA
network, when 2% of nodes with highest PageRank scores are removed, the
average edge betweenness increases 16%). On the other hand, the initial GR
network is the most vulnerable but its average edge betweenness does not
increase too much when a nite number of nodes are removed (by removing
2% of nodes, the average edge betweenness increases only 0.4%). Figure 2
shows the relative dierence of the average edge betweenness when a certain
number of nodes are removed (using PageRank). Similar results are obtained
using node degree and node betweenness as methods of ranking the nodes.
Moreover, GR network shows the largest increase of the average edge be-
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Figure 2: Relative dierence of the average edge betweenness after a nite number of
nodes are removed (using PageRank)
tweenness, while ER network shows the smallest increase of the average edge
betweenness when 5 of the edges are removed from the network. Figure 3
shows the relative dierence of average edge betweenness when a certain
number of edges are removed (using edge betweenness) from the network.
Note that when six edges are removed from the GR network, it becomes
disconnected.
Finally, we investigate how normalized average edge betweenness depends
on certain parameters of the proposed synthetic networks. In particular,
gure 4 shows relative dierence of the average edge betweenness versus the
parametersK andM of the WS and BA models, respectively. From Fig. 4 we
can see that normalized average edge betweenness decreases exponentially for
both networks and approaches 0 (the normalized average edge betweenness
of the fully connected network). For the WS model the mean degree K is in
the interval between 3 and 13. For the BA model we changed the number of
the connections M that a new node has in the range between 1 and 13.
4. Vulnerability Index for real networks
In this section we consider several real-world networks.
 Human brain network { It represents the structural connectivity of the
entire human brain. The data are obtained by a diusion magnetic
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Figure 3: Relative dierence of the average edge betweenness after a nite number of edges
are removed (using edge betweenness)
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Figure 4: Normalized average edge betweenness WS and BA networks versus K and M
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resonance imaging (MRI) scan [20]. The network has two layers: phys-
ical and logical. The logical layer consists of connections in the gray
matter in the brain, while the physical layer reects the axonal wiring
used to establish the logical connections. The logical brain network
(LB) is consisted of 1013 nodes and 30738 edges whilst the average
node degree is 30.343 and the average clustering coecient is 0.456.
The physical brain network (PB) is larger and it has 4445 nodes and
41943 edges whilst the average node degree is 9.436 and the average
clustering coecient is 0.373.
 US power grid network { US power grid (USPG) network is provided
in [21]. This network has 4941 nodes and 13188 edges. The average
node degree is 2.669 and the clustering coecient is 0.107.
 Collaboration network { As a collaboration network, we consider a
network whose edges are the collaboration between Paul Erd}os and
other mathematicians. Erd}os network [21] has 472 nodes and 2; 628
edges (collaborations). Additionally, the average node degree for this
network is 5.568 and the clustering coecient is 0.347.
 Urban transport networks { The transport networks are focused on the
urban street networks in the towns: Turin, Milan and London. The ur-
ban network for Milan consists of 21553 nodes and 29980 edges (roads).
The average node degree is 1.391 and the average clustering coecient
is 0.0231. The Turin network consists of 18147 nodes connected with
26120 edges. In addition, the average node degree for this network is
1.439 and the average clustering coecient is 0.0193. The London net-
work has 8518 nodes and 15495 edges. It has average node degree of
1.819 and average clustering coecient of 0.0794.
 EU power grid network { The experimental dataset contains the elec-
tricity lines above 200kV grouped by disconnected regions: Main Eu-
rope, Nordic Countries, Ireland, and UK. In our simulations only region
Main Europe is analyzed. For this networks, the number of nodes is
4335 and the network has 11102 edges. The average node degree is
equal to 2.561 and the average clustering coecient is equal to 0.0508.
We calculate bnor(G), Dnode(G), and Dedge(G) for all networks. The rela-
tive dierence Dnode(G) is calculated when 10 nodes with the largest PageR-
ank scores are removed from the network. The relative dierence Dedge(G)
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Figure 5: Dynamical robustness of real networks
bnor(G) Dnode(G) Dedge(G)
|||| ||||- |||{
PB 0.0125 0.0011 0.002
LB 0.0165 0.0035 0.001
EC 0.042 0.1282 -
Lo 0.0366 0.0067 0.012
Tu 0.0040 - 0.03
Mi 0.0044 - 0.025
USPG 0.0231 0.0010 0.040
EUPG 0.0001 0.0801 0.004
Table 2: Dynamical robustness of real networks
is calculated when 30 edges with the largest edge betweenness are removed
from the network. The results are shown in Figure 5 and the values of the
vulnerability index are given in Table 2. Two networks with the largest nor-
malized average edge betweenness bnor are EC and Lo, two networks with the
largest Dnode are EC and EUPG, and two networks with the largest Dedge are
USPG and Mi. No data in the table means that the corresponding network
is disconnected.
It is interesting to see that the EUPG is more vulnerable than USPG,
when nodes are removed. In the case when edges are removed the EUPG
shows bigger robustness. This might tell that the two power grid networks
have dierent structure. Of course, we only investigate the vulnerability
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Figure 6: Relative dierence of the bnor after some of the edges are removed (using edge
betweenness)
from structural point of view. The results might change if the dynamic is
considered. In addition, the vulnerability triple also depends on the method
used for building this networks.
Considering vulnerability index as a measure of network vulnerability,
we may conclude that the most robust real-world networks are biological
networks represented here with PB and LP networks. The increase of the
normalized average edge betweenness when a certain number of edges are
removed (using edge betweenness) is shown in Fig.6.
Figure 7 presents the trendline of the relative increase of the edge vulner-
ability of the EU Power Grid, when some of the edges with the highest edge
betweenness are removed. From the Fig. 7 one can see that by removing 100
of the most important edges the vulnerability index increases by around 7%.
In addition, the vulnerability increases with the same trend when removing
from 5 to 70 edges, then in the range between 70 and 100 edges it increases
with a smaller rate. From this analysis we might conclude that the rst 70
edges with the highest edge betweenness value inuence the vulnerability of
the EU power grid the most.
5. Conclusion
In this paper we have suggested that normalized average edge betweenness
together with its relative dierence when certain number of nodes and/or
13
0 20 40 60 80 100
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Number of removed edges
R
el
at
iv
e 
di
ffe
re
nc
e 
of
 a
ve
ra
ge
 e
dg
e 
be
tw
ee
nn
es
s
(in
 pe
rce
nts
)
EU Power Grid (REG1)
Figure 7: Relative dierence of the bnor after some of the edges are removed (using edge
betweenness) for the region 1 of the EU Power Grid
edges are removed from the network forms a triple that can be used as a
measure of network vulnerability (called vulnerability index). WS model
of small-world network appears to be the most robust network among all
synthetic networks studied in the paper. This conclusion is due to the fact
that this model shows highest structural robustness when nodes or edges
are removed form the graph and also the vulnerability index, as a triple, is
relatively low in respect to the other synthetic networks (only when removing
edges it showed a little bit higher vulnerability than the scale-free network),
which means that the dynamical robustness is also high for this model (this
results comply with results in [22]). Using the same analysis, one might say
that the biological networks (human brain networks) are the most robust
networks among all real-world networks studied in the paper.
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